

Efficiency in the Education sector

Intangible assets and locus of decision-making

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Motivation

Spending on education in the EU is an average of 6% of GDP, of which 90% from public funds.

How efficiently are these funds being spent?

Research questions

- What is the role of intangible capital in the provision of education?
- Are centralised countries more efficient in the provision of education compared to decentralised countries?



Outline

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Methodology

2 stage procedure

- Stage 1: Non-parametric estimation of the production function of education relates education outputs to education inputs and yields efficiency scores
- Stage 2: Regression of the efficiency scores on environmental variables

Data requirements

- Education output
- Education inputs
- Environmental variables



Education output

Education output

Quality-adjusted measure of the number of students going through the education system

O'Mahony & Stevens (2009), Schreyer (2010), INDICSER (2012)

Compulsory Education (ISCED 0 to 2):

$$Y_{CE} = PISA * (N_0 + N_1 + N_2)$$
 (1)

Post-compulsory Education (ISCED 3 to 6):

$$Y_{PCE} = \sum_{ISCED3}^{ISCED6} N_i * \overline{W_i}$$
 (2)

where

$$\overline{W_i} = p_i^G p_i^E W_i + (1 - p_i^G) p_{i-1}^E W_{i-1}$$
 (3)

Education output

- N_i : Number of students enrolled in ISCED level i (Eurostat)
- PISA: average PISA reading scores, measured at age 15 (OECD)
- W_i: Average wage of population with education level ISCED i (Eurostat)
- p_i^E : employment rate by education level ISCED i (Eurostat)
- p_i^G : graduation rate by education level ISCED i

Flexibility of non-parametric methodology does not require aggregating compulsory and post-compulsory levels. Output measured in **levels** rather than growth rates.

Education inputs

- 1 Number of employees in the Education sector
- 2 Capital stock in the Education sector
- 3 Intangible capital stock in the Education sector

Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) Soci-Economic Accounts, OECD STAN database, SPINTAN database (forthcoming)



Environmental variables


3 main variables are important for student achievement (Woessmann, 2003):


- Teacher quality
- Competition from private schools
- Locus of decision making

Sources: Education at a Glance (OECD, 2011, 2012) and Eurostat



Parametric vs. Non-Parametric production functions





Production function of education

Input efficiency score

Amount by which observed inputs can be reduced and still produce the observed level of output

$$\theta_{DEA}(x, y) = \inf \{ \theta \mid (\theta x, y) \in \Psi_{DEA} \}$$
 (4)

$$\theta_{DEA}(x,y) = \inf \left\{ \theta \mid y \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \gamma_{i} Y_{i}; \theta x \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \gamma_{i} X_{i}; \theta > 0; RTS \right\}$$

$$0 < \theta \le 1 \tag{6}$$

4-dimensional framework:

Outputs
$$Y_{it} = \begin{pmatrix} Y_{CE} \\ Y_{PCF} \end{pmatrix}_{it}$$
 and inputs $X_{it} = \begin{pmatrix} E \\ K \end{pmatrix}_{it}$




Caveats of DEA

- 1 Deterministic framework with no room for statistical error
- Upward bias of efficiency scores We apply simple bootstrap to get the bias-corrected efficiency scores.
- Sensitivity to outliers
- 4 Curse of dimensionality Adding intangible investment will affect the issue of dimensionality. We can test how much this extra dimension adds explanatory power.

Efficiency scores

Bias-corrected input efficiency scores, average over 2002-2010



Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat, OECD and WIOD



Estimation equation

Truncated Regression

$$\theta_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{ TeachSalaries}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{RatioPrivate}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Decisions}_{it} + u_{it}$$
(7)

$$0 \le \theta_{it} \le 1$$



Variables

Dependent variable: Efficiency scores from Stage 1 **Explanatory variables**:

- Relative teacher pay compared to GDP per capita
- Percentage of students enrolled in private institutions
- Locus of decision-making: % of decisions taken at a each level

	Central	Intermediate	School	Sum
Personnel	x _p			100%
Resource	x_r			100%
Org. of instruction	X _i			100%
Planning & structures	X _S			100%
TOTAL	$\frac{(x_p++x_s)}{4}$			100%

Results

Summary decision-making index

	Eff1	Eff2	$Eff1_{BC}$	Eff2 _{BC}
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
teachsal	.476 (.125)***	.299 (.146)**	.387 (.130)***	.210 (.126)*
ratioprivall	445 (.214)**		535 (.196)***	
ratiopriv0to2		.396 (.288)		.471 (.237)**
ratiopriv3to6		692 (.219)***		828 (.192)***
decisionscentral	005 (.001)***	003 (.002)**	004 (.001)***	002 (.001)
decisionsschool	0004 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.0008 (.002)	.005 (.002)**
cons	.501 (.156)***	.491 (.143)***	.477 (.150)***	.448 (.128)***



Results

Looking at decision areas

	Decisions	Pers	Res	Inst	Plan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
teachsal	.304 (.102)***	.374 (.091)***	.277 (.100)***	.209 (.085)**	.219 (.090)**
ratiopriv3to6	423 (.138)***	343 (.113)***	286 (.127)**	334 (.131)**	299 (.165)*
decisionscentral	004 (.001)***				
persmanagcentral		004 (.0005)***			
resourcescentral			003 (.001)***		
instructioncentral				008 (.001)***	
planningcentral					0001 (.0008)
cons	.605 (.100)***	.512 (.094)***	.542 (.113)***	.658 (.093)***	.595 (.078)***



Results

Looking at decision areas

	All	PersPlan	ResPlan	InstPlan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
teachsal	.276 (.101)***	.345 (.084)***	.260 (.099)***	.166 (.088)*
ratiopriv3to6	166 (.136)	140 (.131)	140 (.149)	153 (.149)
persmanagcentral	005 (.001)***	005 (.0004)***		
resourcescentral	.002 (.001)		004 (.001)***	
instructioncentral	005 (.003)*			009 (.001)***
planningcentral	.002 (.0006)***	.002 (.0006)***	.001 (.0007)**	.002 (.0006)***
cons	.522 (.105)***	.429 (.074)***	.475 (.112)***	.600 (.089)***



Summary of the results

- Teacher quality is consistently associated with higher school efficiency
- The presence of private institutions seems to matter only for post-compulsory education, and is associated with worse school efficiency
- The centralisation of decisions at the national level seems to be detrimental to efficiency, apart from decisions relating to planning and structures, such as programme design and accreditation.



Next steps

- Include Intangible capital stock as a third input By definition, will increase the efficiency of units. Agnostic about how this will change the ranking of countries, and hence results of the 2nd stage regression
- 2-stage Bootstrap procedure (Simar and Wilson, 2007) Necessary to take into account that the dependent variable is estimated and is sensitive to outliers. Will affect the standard errors.
- Semi-Parametric approaches (eg. SFA)
 Imposes structure either on the error term or on the production function



Thank you for your attention



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